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Since the publication of Edmund Morris' scholarly, yet compellingly readable depiction of the youth and early career of Theodore Roosevelt,1 biographical writing has seemingly entered a new
era, one in which narrative sweep is as highly prized as exhaustive
research, and in which accuracy manages to coexist with the aim of
engaging the reader. The current trend in biography eschews hagiography, seeking to explore the character of the subject with the
insight of a novelist wedded to sound scholarship. While not all
recent biographies aspire to this high standard, the best do, and
these have been unusually plentiful, ranging fields as diverse as science, literature, and politics.2
This wider boom in the biography industry has led to a corresponding boomlet in judicial biography. After decades of neglect,
for example, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has been the subject
of not one but three ambitious volumes since 1989.' Similarly,
judges as diverse as William 0. Douglas,4 the first and second Jus* Associate, Solovay & Edlin, J.D. Columbia Law School, 1990. B.A., Fordham
College. The author wishes to thank Michael T. Fois, Holly Gale Millette and especially, John D. Wirenius for providing inspiration.
I EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT (1979).

2 Recent examples include Michael Holroyd's four volume GEORGE BERNARD
SHAW (THE SEARCH FOR LOVE (1988); THE PURSUIT OF POWER (1989); THE LURE OF
FANTASY

(1991) and

THE LAST LAUGH

(1993));

BLANCHE WIESEN COOK, ELEANOR

1992); VICrORIA GLENDINNING, TROLLOPE: A VICTORIAN LIFE
(1993); N. JOHN HALL, TROLLOPE: A BIOGRAPHY (1991); WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE
1,

ROOSEVELT

(vol.

LAST LION:

A LIFE

OF WINSTON CHURCHILL (VISIONS OF GLORY

(1983) and

ALONE

(1988)); ANNE SOMERSET, ELIZABETH I (1991).
s In chronological order: SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE (1989); LIVA
BAKER, THEJUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL (1991); and G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF (1993). See also GARY AICHELE, OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR.: SOLDIER, SCHOLAR AND JUDGE (1989) (a less ambitious introduction to Holmes's life and thought).
4 JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY- THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
(1980) [hereinafter SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY].
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tices John Marshalli Harlan, 5 Thurgood Marshall6 and Abe Fortas7
have been the subject of full length volumes, of admittedly varying
quality. Moreover, these volumes all adopt the contemporary approach to biography: to seek to bring the subject's character into
focus through recounting his or her life story. By shedding the dry
scholasticism which has pervaded much judicial biography8 as well
by refusing to create myths regarding the subject,9 they frequently
live up to the highest standards of both literature and of
scholarship.1
In this propitious environment, Gerald Gunther, one of the
nation's most respected constitutional scholars, has written the first
full length biography of Learned Hand, easily the most admired
and influential federal judge never to sit on the Supreme Court of
the United States. Gunther, who has been working on this biography on and off since at least 1975,11 served as Hand's clerk for the
1953-1954 term of court, when Hand was a senior (retired, or in
Hand's case, semi-retired) judge of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.' 2 He writes of his former mentor with enormous affec5 LOREN BETH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JUSTICE (1992); TINSLEY
E. YARBROUGH AND JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WARREN
COURT (1992).
6 MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE
BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH (1992).
7 See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE

(1988).

8 See, e.g. Mark DeWolfe Howe's two volumes on Holmes, JUSTICE HOLMES: THE
SHAPING YEARS 1641-1870 (1957) and JUSTICE HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 1870-1882

(1960). Each volume is chock-full of information and brimming with valuable exposition of Holmes's evolution as a thinker, but a soporific reading experience due to
Howe's pedestrian prose style, and indifference toward narrative.
9 Holmes has also received this treatment, in Catherine Drinker Bowen's charming, but heavily fictionalized book YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS (1944). This occasionally
filmed account of Holmes's life was sentimental, but oversimplified his life so
agreeably that it succeeded in transforming the aristocratic Holmes into a folk hero.
While most judicial biographies do not slide off the trail into whimsy, they tend to be
reverential, almost like an extended eulogy for their subject. See, e.g., MERLOJ. PUSEY,
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1951); SILAS BENT,JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1932);
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946).
10 Holmes especially has been fortunate in his biographers; the two most recent,
Baker and White, are especially admirable, and their works read especially well together. Where Baker excels in her depiction of Holmes's life off the bench and out of
the legal arena, White presents his thought and its development with precision and
clarity. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 3; WHITE, supra note 3.

11 Gunther attributes his perusal of Hand's papers to research for the instant biography. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragmentsof History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 719 (1975) [hereinafter Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins].
12 GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE xviii (1994).
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tion, although seeking to portray him "warts and all.""
Ironically, in view of Gunther's standing as a legal and constitutional scholar, he is most successful when exploring the private
individual, his character and those of his friends and his enigmatic
feminist wife Frances (his children, oddly, remain shadowy, peripheral figures). When evaluating Hand's contribution to jurisprudence, and setting forth his views on subjects ranging from
freedom of speech to the proper role of the judiciary in a free society, Gunther's book presents a regrettably sanitized, misleading
and incomplete depiction of the Judge's philosophy. Worse, he
flinches away from the implications of Hand's philosophy, seeking
to squeeze this most complex and ambiguous jurist into the mold
of a conventional civil libertarian.
LEA£FWv HAND. THE Mim
Billings Learned Hand was born on January 27, 1872, the second and last child of Samuel and Lydia Hand.14 Hand was the son
of a rather successful appellate lawyer of a philosophical bent and
considerable bibliomania and, as Gunther describes, an overprotective, "smothering" mother. 5 Gunther backs up these characterizations with ample instances, showing that Hand grew up with
more than his share of diffidence, and in constant doubt of his
own abilities."
Hand's father's early death, when young "Bill" or "Bun" (as
Hand was known throughout his life among his family and friends)
was only fourteen years old, left him Without a counterbalance to
this maternal influence. Nevertheless, it also left an imposing exemplar.1 7 No matter how far Hand progressed in his career, he
would always compare himself intellectually and professionally to
his father-almost always to his own disadvantage. 8 Ironically,
both father and son shared some of the same traits, including a
nervous disposition, a tendency toward melancholy, and a delight
in the intellectual life.' 9 Both also followed family tradition by entering the legal profession.20
Learned Hand was educated at Albany Academy (from 1879 to
13

Id.

14 Id. at
15 Id. at
16 Id. at
17 Id. at
18 Id. at
19 Id.
20 Id. at

3.
5-9.

10.

22-23.
7-9.
13-15.
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1889), and graduated from Harvard College in 1893.21 At Harvard,
he felt like an outsider, after failing to be elected to any of
Harvard's prestigious clubs. 22 But it was at Harvard that he first
became engaged as a student, responding to the "magnetic" teaching of George Santayana and to the skeptical William James, as well
as to Josiah Royce, whose human qualities drew the young Hand
more than his ideas, and Frank W. Taussig, who sparked his interest in economics. 23 Like Oliver Wendell Holmes before him, Hand
contemplated a career in academia, teaching philosophy; again,
like Holmes, Hand was "shoved into the law", 24 bowing to family
pressure, primarily by his uncle, Richard Hand.2 5
At Harvard Law School, Hand found himself far more accepted than at the college. For one thing, law school "was more
meritocratic."26 For another, he and Fred Townsend, a more socially accepted friend from Harvard College, found a congenial
group of law students with more intellectual interests than the
norm. Although Hand was selected for the Law Review, and the
then-prestigious Pow-Wow Club, which was essentially a moot court
group, Hand nonetheless never became terribly active in either. In
fact, he dropped the Law Review after working on only four issues,
explaining his decision by stating that he had enrolled in the Law
School "to get a legal education, not to edit or write parts of a
magazine.27
Hand had a poor opinion of Christopher Columbus Langdell,
the originator of the case method of legal instruction, who was
then near the end of his long career.2" He responded far more
positively, in an eager fashion he later described as "more adolescent than most," to the less dogmatic faculty members, such as
James Barr Ames, James Bradley Thayer, and John Chipman
Gray.2 9 Interestingly, Hand eschewed the logicians, Christopher
Columbus Langdell and Samuel Williston, as firmly as he did the
wholly practical, such as Jeremiah Smith." ° Although Gunther
does not make an overt point of it, this suggests that Hand was
already forming his intensely idiosyncratic world view as a skeptic,
21

22
23
24
25

Id. at 23-32.
Id. at 27-29.
Id. at 34-37.

HOLMEs-1,AsKi LErEus, 204-05 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 40-43.
26 Id. at 44.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 43, 46-47.
29 Id. at 47.
30 Id. at 47-48.
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unable to easily accept any creed or ideology. Hand would never
be the whole-hearted political partisan that Felix Frankfurter
would be, although they would be allies in many struggles.
After law school, Hand eked out an unhappy existence practicing law in Albany, and later, in New York City. These years were
perhaps the least happy of his life, blighted by the perpetual fear
that he would fall behind, proving to be inadequate as a member
of the profession in which his father had shone, even briefly sitting
on the state's highest court.3 1 After two years in Albany of his
doomed striving toward professional success, Hand again began to
pursue intellectual matters. Nominated by his cousin and close
friend Augustus "Gus" Noble Hand, Hand became a member of
the "no-name" club, a group of New York and Boston lawyers who
met monthly to discuss issues of all kinds.32
In August 1901, Hand, already inspired by his life-long aversion to his home town of Albany, 3 was galvanized into renewed
effort in seeking a position in New York City when he met and fell
34
in love with Frances Fincke, the daughter of a wealthy lawyer.
Frances graduated from Bryn Mawr, where she studied under the
intellectually rigorous, convention-despising Martha Carey
Thomas.3 5 Thomas so despised the conventional Victorian marriages that she once declared "Our failures only marry."3 6 Educated in an unusually competitive atmosphere for Victorian
females, the students of Bryn Mawr formed passionate friendships-so intense that, as Gunther states, their expressions of affec37
tion for each other "might arouse suspicions of lesbianism today."
Id. at 8.
Id. at 60.
33 Id. at 20.
34 Id. at 77.
35 Id. at 88-92.
36 Id. at 91.
37 Id. at 95-96. The hothouse intensity of relationships at Bryn Mawr in the late
19th Century as exhibited by Frances Fincke and Mildred Minturn is elsewhere welldocumented. Mark Twain's daughter, Olivia Susan Clemens ("Susy" to her family,
"Olivia" to her Bryn Mawr friends) wrote letters to her classmate Louise Brownwell of
an even more intimate nature than those exchanged by Frances and Mildred. Susy
Clemens's letters reflect an almost physical yearning, and are highly suggestive of sexual intimacy. OLIVIA S. CLEMENS, PAPA xxiii et seq. (C. Neider ed., 1987). Yet both Susy
Clemens and Louise Brownwell went on to engage in romantic relationships with
men.
Single sex education combined with residence has, of course, been claimed to
have fostered same-sex intimacies on the part of those whose eventual sexual preference would prove to be for the opposite gender. With reference to the British Public
school system, for example, John Mortimer (a Harrow graduate) describes himself at
school as existing in "achrysalis of vague schoolboy homosexuality" from which he
31
32
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Gunther dismisses this prospect, but does describe the odd strain
of possessiveness Frances displayed when her own closest friend,
Mildred Minturn, flirted with marriage, and then married. As summarized by Gunther, the correspondence between the two sounds
far more like that between two lovers, one seeking to change the
terms of the relationship, and the other seeking to preserve an intimacy for the lack of any competing intimacy." Whatever the nature of their relationship, both Mildred and Frances would strive to
live up to their mentor Thomas's ideal. Mildred did this through
bursts of hard work punctuated by bouts of "neurasthenia," the
popular Victorian term for nervous exhaustion, and Frances
through sporadic efforts to pursue the sort of rigorous self-educative reading that their mentor would have approved. 9
Learned Hand met Frances Fincke while both were staying
with different, although acquainted, friends at Murray Bay, ninety
miles downriver from Quebec. Frances was staying with the Minturns, when Hand lay siege to the house in an effort to win her,
with a persistence which is somewhat surprising from this diffident
and self-doubting man. Frances was far from sure that she reciprocated Learned's feelings; after he proposed to her, she took over a
year to accept his proposal. Indeed, after accepting him one evening, she later changed her mind, and summoned him to the Minturns' cottage, where she was again staying, to break off the hoursold engagement. When hearing him approach, "singing and
whistling, obviously overjoyed by the success of his long courtship",
Frances again changed her mind, unwilling to change his elation
to disappointment.4"
Hand's marriage was about his only solace in his first few years
in New York, where he found himself repeatedly cast as the underappreciated junior partner. 4 1 Temperamentally unsuited for the
only emerged at University. JOHN MORTIMER, CLINGING TO THE WRECKAGE 47 (1978).
Frances Fincke and her Bryn Mawr compatriots may well fit this paradigm. However,
the fact that the two women planned a "Boston Marriage," a post-graduation domestic
arrangement common among Bryn Mawr graduates of the time, argues that the two
had a significant commitment to each other. Interestingly, some of these "Boston
Marriages" endured for years, including the arrangement between Martha Carey
Thomas and her companion. GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 96.
38 GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 179-81. In turn, Mildred described her reaction to
Frances's growing interest in Hand's suit in similarly stark terms: "I shall never forget
how physically sick the thought of losing her made me feel," she confided in her
diary. Id. at 96.
39 Id. at 92-94, 97-98. Frances also served on the Board of Trustees at her alma
mater, Bryn Mawr. Id. at 90.
40 Id. at 78-79.
41 Id. at 101-07.
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hurly burly of life at the bar, he began to make a name for himself
as an intellectual through the "no-name" club and his writings.4 2
His most important essay was a stinging attack on the Supreme
Court's decision in Lochner v. New York. 4' His contempt for Lochner's expansive use of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was later the most settled and controversial hallmark
of his jurisprudence.
Hand also began following politics, even campaigning for a
reform candidate for mayor of New York. 4 Unlike his more
worldly cousin Gus, Hand did not follow his family's Democratic
tradition. Rather, in 1898, he began allying himself with the Republican candidate for Governor, the ex-Rough Rider Theodore
Roosevelt. 45 Hand's commitment to Roosevelt would deepen
throughout Roosevelt's career, culminating in Hand's support of
Roosevelt's third party presidential bid.46
Hand's route to the bench, however, was not simply a result of
his political interests. Rather, it stemmed from his growing disenchantment with law practice, as his latest junior partnership remained more junior than partner, and from his friendship with
Charles C. Burlingham. Burlingham was a successful, but by no
means brilliantly intellectual, lawyer whom Hand met through his
cousin Gus in 1903. 4 7 More politically influential than today seems
warranted, Burlingham grew fonder of Hand during the 1903 mayoral campaign, where both opposed Tammany Hall's candidate in
vain.48 Four years later, Burlingham responded enthusiastically to
Hand's request that Burlingham bring his extensive political influence to bear and wangle an appointment to the District Court
bench for Hand.49 Their first collaboration in 1907 failed, largely
because the vacancy Hand and his competitors were seeking never
existed; Congress did not create another position in the Southern
District of New York as expected. Hand's domineering father-inlaw, after vociferously opposing his son-in-law's plans to leave legal
practice, provided key advice in assembling a coalition of backers,
partisans and friends who finally secured Hand's appointment to
Id. at 107-09.
Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-HourDay, 21 I-HAv. L. REv. 495
(1908) (critiquing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). See GUNTHER, supra
note 12, at 118-23.
44 Id. at 109-15.
45 Id. at 63-64.
46 Id. at 205-32.
47 Id. at 107-08.
48 Id. at 109-12.
49 Id. at 109, 123, 130.
42

43
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the bench in 1909 by President William Howard Taft.5" Fortunately for Hand's prospects, President Taft wanted nothing more
than to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Taft especially desired a vital and efficient judiciary, and thus supported a meritocratic approach to the appointment of lower court judges.5 1 In
appointing Learned Hand, Taft achieved his goal. In 1924, Calvin
Coolidge appointed Hand to the Second Circuit, in another merit
based appointment. Coolidge's conservative administration appointed Learned Hand despite his defection to the Progressive
Party in 1912, which permanently alienated then ChiefJustice Taft,
52
who accordingly had opposed his promotion.
Gunther excels in engagingly presenting the essentially undramatic public life, and the more complex private life, of Learned
Hand. Gunther even brings secondary figures such as Thomas and
Burlingham to life with a striking vividness. The author strips away
the mask of certitude that the Judge wore, and shows Hand as a
complex, insecure skeptic, motivated by equal parts of compassion
and dubiety. In all of his forays into politics after his appointment
to the District Court, and especially after his elevation to the Second Circuit in 1924, Hand, unlike his great friend Felix Frankfurter, yielded to his need to be involved in the great struggles of
the day in the face of his conviction that his involvement in political controversies was improper.5" While this means that Hand, unlike Frankfurter, sat out several key issues of the day (such as the
Sacco-Vanzetti case)," he is not vulnerable to the charges of hypoc55
risy that devastate Frankfurter's reputation today.
Regarding Frankfurter, it should be noted that Gunther's portrayal of the pushing, proselytizing little justice is oddly endearing.
Unlike most accounts published in recent years, Gunther's enables
50 Id. at 123-29.
51 Id. at 129.

Id. at 275-77.
See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 386-88.
54 For Frankfurter's efforts to interest Hand in this case and Hand's rather insensitive treatment of Frankfurter, see GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 388-96. For examples of
Hand wrestling with his desire to involve himself, see id. at 231-32 (declining to draft
portions of Progressive campaign platform in 1912); id. at 344-45 (renouncing political engagement). He occasionally yielded to his activist impulses, although generally
he came to regret it. See id. at 237-38 (regretting running for a state court appellate
judgeship); id. at 540-41 (giving up political engagements after World War II). Hand
publicly opposed McCarthyism, but agonized over the propriety of his doing so. Id. at
587-92.
55 See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS (1989); Urofsky, Conflict Among the
Brethren: Felix Frankfurter,William 0. Douglas, and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DuKE L.J. 71 (1986).
52
53

1994]

BOOK REVIEW

513

the reader to see Frankfurter's unwavering commitment and integrity of his passionate political crusades. So often, this side of Frankfurter becomes obscured by the pedantry and sanctimoniousness
which was typical of him, and marred so many of his relationships.5 6 Gunther sees Frankfurter's flaws, but keeps his virtues in
sight as well. The author's sympathetic portrayal of Frankfurter
helps explain the typically blunt statement of William 0. Douglas,
Frankfurter's most reviled enemy, that "Felix belonged on this
Court.""'
Hand never received an appointment to the Supreme Court;
that he was bypassed in favor of less prominent or well-respected
men presents the obvious enigma regarding his professional life.
Gunther handles this issue deftly, detailing Hand's various chances
for promotion in a manner reminding the modern reader that
Supreme Court nominations have long been political in nature. In
fact, in the 1920s Hand was considered for a seat on the High
Court several times. Nonetheless, in part due to Chief Justice
Taft's influence, Hand was rejected for this esteemed position.5"
As Hand grew older, his chances to receive an appointment diminished. It was unfortunate for Hand that his last realistic chance for
a seat on the Court brought him into competition with former justice and presidential candidate Charles Evans Hughes. When
Chief Justice Taft resigned in 1930, Hand was fifty-eight, still of
readily appointable age.5 9 Based on several sources, Gunther asserts that President Herbert Hoover wavered between two options:
he would either appoint Hughes to the center chair, or elevate an
already sitting justice, Harlan Fiske Stone, to the center and fill the
Associate Justice vacancy by nominating Hand. 60 Gunther suggests
that Hoover offered the position to Hughes with the expectation
that he would decline it, as Hughes's son was Solicitor General.
With Hughes declining this nomination, and Hoover paying his
political debt to Hughes, Hoover planned to nominate his actual
choice, Stone.6 Partisans of Hughes and Stone dispute this highly
56 For examples of the more critical accounts of Frankfurter which predominate
the academic and biographical portrayals of the last fifteen or so years, see BRUCE
ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982); SIMON, supra note
55; Urofsky, supra note 55.
57 See GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 389-92, 492-93; see also SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 4, at 8-9.
58 GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 239.
59 Id. at 418.

60 Id. at 419 et seq..

61 Id. at 420-21.
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controversial account.6 2 Nonetheless, Hughes received the appointment, and Hand's reaction of personal disappointment tends
63
to establish that he, at any rate, believed he was in the running.
Hand's final chance for a Supreme Court appointment came
in 1942, when Franklin Roosevelt considered appointing him to
the seat vacated by James F. Byrnes. 64 At the time, Hand was seventy years old, and Roosevelt had gone painfully on record in his
Court-packing plan as distrusting the ability of judges over that
age.6 5 Beyond this, according to Attorney General Francis Biddle
and Justice William 0. Douglas, Frankfurter's incessant lobbying
backfired; Roosevelt's inclination not to appoint Hand was
strengthened by his irritation with Frankfurter.6 6 More fundamentally, Hand's judicial views were simply inconsistent with
Roosevelt's.6 7 Hand's failure to obtain an appointment to the
Supreme Court caused him bitter disappointment; characteristically, he castigated himself without mercy for his ambition.6"
In Gunther's book, Hand's children receive scant attention.
Additionally, Gunther's portrayal of the later years of Hand's marriage is set out in one chapter, "The Marriage and its Tensions," in
a way that artificially isolates it from the stream of the narrative. 69
This is so that Gunther can get on with the main business of his
62
63

See, e.g., 2 MERLO S. PusEY, CHARLEs EvANs HUGHES 652-53 (1951).
Id. at 421-27 (describing the controversy surrounding contrasting accounts of

Hughes' nomination and Hand's reaction).
64 Id. at 553-54.
65
66

Id. at 555-57.
Id. at 561-62. Gunther disputes William 0. Douglas's account based upon its

chronology in relation to the nomination process. Nevertheless, Gunther admits its
depiction of Frankfurter is on point.
67 Id. at 562-64. Hand stated on this issue that Roosevelt "may well have found me

alien; I fancy he did." Id. at 568.
68 Id. at 569-70.
69 Id. at 171-89.

Gunther does, however, give more details of the marriage later in

the book. See id. at 570-72. Gunther's account of Frances Hand's 30 year relationship

with Louis Dow, a friend of both her and Learned's, tends to acquit her of her more
than profound friendship with Dow. Id. at 187. In fact, the pair's relationship caused
great scandal among their circle of friends and acquaintances, including Walter Lippmann, who wrote of Hand that the "first task of that man's biographer will be to
enquire why he remained for so long on good terms with his wife's lover)," inclines
toward acquitting her of more than profound friendship with Dow. Id. at 500. At the
time Lippmann made this statement, his own friendship with Hand had soured, in

part due to Lippmann's own marital woes. Id. As Gunther notes, however, the flood
of endearments which typified the early Frances-Learned correspondence dried up
while she sojourned abroad and spent time at the Hand summer home with Dow.

These endearments between Learned and Frances resumed upon Dow's death in
1944. Even Gunther notes that the result of Dow's death was that Hand "found

greater peace in his marriage." Id. at 570.
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volume: an exploration of Hand's remarkable impact as the most
respected lower court judge in American history.
L

vARmED HAND." THE JuDGE

Gunther relies on the informal memoranda exchanged by the
Second Circuit judges, as well as on Hand's private memoranda to
show Hand's unique influence.7 0 Hand's reputation for brilliance,
won as a district court judge, did not alone give him preeminence.
Rather, Hand's ability to reason persuasively within the common
law context gave his opinions such great weight."1 Gunther shows
this in many fields, ranging from patent, to maritime law, and even
in simple tort cases. 72
It is in his portrayal of Hand as judge, however, that Gunther
begins to go astray, both underestimating and overestimating
Hand's contributions to the law. To begin with a startling omission, Gunther fails to even mention Hand's decision in United States
v. Carroll Towing," hailed by scholars as providing "an economic
meaning of negligence" and thereby marking the beginning of the
Law and Economics theoretical movement. 4 Moreover, the Carroll
Towing opinion was not a freak, but a deliberate, conscious innovation on Hand's part, which he reaffirmed a year later, again offering the so-called "Learned Hand Formula" as an appropriate
means of calculating when and whether to impose liability in tort.7 5
Indeed, even retired Justice Lewis Powell, in listing Hand's contributions to the law in a Foreword to this very book, underscores the
oddness of the omission, stating that "[f]irst year students of torts
know Hand for" Carroll Towing and its importance to "the application of economic principles to legal analysis."7 6
In Carroll Towing, Hand defined a barge owner's duty:
to provide against resulting injuries [a]s a function of three
variables:
(1) The probability that she will break away;
(2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does;
70 Id. at 291-95, 297-98.

71 Id. at 297-98.
72 Id. at 306 et seq..
73 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
74 See Calibresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test of Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1060-61 (1972); Richard A. Posner, Learned HandFormulafor DeterminingLiability
in TORT LAW CASES AND ECONOMICS, ch. 1 (1982); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD., 29, 32-33- (1972); see also United States Fidelity & Guarantee
Co. v. Jadranska Slobodn Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
75 Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, CJ.).
76 Lewis F. Powell, Foreword in GUNTHER, supra note 12, at x.
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(3) the burden of adequate precautions
....if the probability be called P; the injury L; and the burden
B, liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
7
7

p.

Thus for Hand, the tort-feasor acts at his or her peril when the
burden is less than the probability and the magnitude of the likely
injury multiplied. 8
The omission of Carroll Towing and Hand's later restatement
of its rule is especially unfortunate, as Hand's relationship to the
Law and Economics movement stands in need of exploration from
a biographical standpoint. Not only did Carroll Towing foreshadow
the arguments advanced as a tool for analysis in negligence and
other civil cases, but, in United States v. Dennis, Hand even anticipates Judge Richard Posner in the application of economic principles to legal analysis of non-financial interests."9 In leading to the
formation of an entire school ofjurisprudential theory, CarrollTowing has a strong claim to be considered Hand's most significant
contribution to jurisprudential theory.
Compounding this startling omission is one outright and obvious misstatement of the law of free speech, a lapse which is extremely disconcerting coming from a constitutional scholar of
Gunther's renown. In praising Hand's contribution to the jurisprudence of free speech, Gunther states that "[b]y the late 1960s,
the Supreme Court announced its most speech protective standard
ever. And that standard is essentially an embracing of Hand's
Masses approach."8" This statement is at best a half-truth.
In Masses PublishingCo v. Patten,"' Hand construed the Espionage Act, consistent with his reading of the First Amendment, to
77 159 F.2d at 173.

Id.
183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). Hand, as seen infra, used economic analysis to
determine the parameters of constitutional protection accorded to speech; Posner
suggests its applicability to the substantive criminal law. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 GOLUM. L. REv. 1193 (1985).
80 Gunther, supra note 12 at 152. Oddly, Gunther does not identify the case which
"embraced" Hand's approach in Masses. His footnote to the quoted statement, footnote 200 to page 152, merely refers the reader "for my fuller analyses of the Masses
case" to his 1975 article. Similarly, when Gunther states that Hand's was "an analysis
that, decades later, became the law of the land," he does so without providing any
support or elaboration. This failure to explain how Hand's First Amendment jurisprudence has allegedly become the law is especially disconcerting as, as is shown in
the text, the statements cannot be accepted as accurate.
81 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd. 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917) (holding that left-wing
magazine's opposition to First World War and conscription did not violate Espionage
Act, as magazine fell short of advocating violation of law).
78
79
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require the "direct incitement" or "direct advocacy" of unlawful
conduct prior to permitting suppression of a speaker by the government.8 2 Should such direct advocacy be established, no likelihood of an actual violation of the law was necessary; even if the
speaker stood alone in the rain vainly shouting, he or she could be
prosecuted. 3 The Supreme Court did not adopt this test in the
late 1960s, or indeed ever. In Brandenburg v. Ohio,84 in order to
justify suppression, the Court required, in addition to direct advocacy of unlawful conduct by a speaker, that the advocacy take place
in a context such that an "imminent" danger of unlawful conduct
was created.85 This new test fused the most speech protective aspects of Hand's approach to a strict reading of the clear and present danger test advocated by Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Louis D. Brandeis. That test, even in its earliest incarnation, required as a prerequisite to suppression that the utterance of the
speech first create a significant risk (a "clear and present danger")
of an evil's resulting; second, that evil must be one Congress has the
right to act to prevent; third (and finally), the actor must have given
tongue to the speech with the specific intent of causing that very evil.86

In recent years, it has become increasingly fashionable to exalt
Hand's contribution to free speech jurisprudence. This trend
82 Id. For a detailed account of Hand's development of his own First Amendment
test through a construction of the Espionage Act, as well as an account of the correspondence between Hand and Holmes suggesting that Holmes's conversion may have
partially been caused by Hand's advocacy of a more libertarian test, see Gunther,
supra note 11. This same viewpoint is expounded in GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 15170. Gunther's conclusions are fully endorsed by David Rabban, The Emergence of Modem FirstAmendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1205, 1210 (1983).
83 As Hand later wrote to a former clerk, "I would make the purpose of the utterer
the test of his constitutional protection. Did he seek to bring about a violation of
existing law? If he did, I see no reason why the constitution should protect him,
however remote the chances of his success." GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 604-05. Even
Gunther admits elsewhere in his book that the Masses test forms only "part of the law
of the land," plainly referring to the Brandenburgtest. Id. at 170.
84 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
85 Id. at 446-48.
86 See Wirenius, The Road to Brandenburg: A Look at the Evolving Understandingof the
FirstAmendment, 43 DRAKE L. Rv. 1 (1994) (explicating Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919) (affirming convictions of anti-war protesters under Espionage Act on ground that such conduct presented a "clear and present danger" that
unlawful conduct would occur)).
This forthcoming article details Holmes's gradual evolution from a common law
approach to interpreting the First Amendment to a recognition that the Amendment
represents a radical shift from the common law modes of reasoning in which Holmes
and Hand excelled. Many of the Holmes-Hand comparisons in this book review are
set out more fully in this article.
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dates back to Gunther's own 1975 article setting out Hand's efforts
to persuade Holmes to adopt the bright-line rule in Masses.
Holmes, as Gunther recounts, corresponded with Hand regarding
the proper level of protection to be accorded to anti-government
speech. Hand urged Holmes to adopt a more intent-based approach, leading Holmes to reply that "I don't see how you differ
from the test as stated by me.""8 Gunther, in his 1975 article, referred to this comment as proof of "Holmes' lack of awareness of
distinctions quite plain to more concerned contemporary observers." 89 He maintains this position in the biography. 90 However,
Holmes's perplexity seems more natural in view of the often-overlooked intent requirement in his own test,9 1 as is patently clear
from the context of the letter reprinted in Gunther's article. Just
prior to the comment allegedly showing Holmes's obliviousness, he
writes concerning intent, backing away partially from his opinion
in Debs v. United States and concluding somewhat defensively "[e]ven
if absence of intent might not be a defence I suppose that the pres92
ence of it might be material."
Bearing the intent requirement of Debs in mind, it is easier to
understand Holmes's confusion; their differences are in fact quite
narrow. This is particularly true in light of Hand's statement that
"I haven't any doubt that Debs was guilty under any rule conceivably applicable,"9 ' a comment Gunther in his article writes off as "an
87 See GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 161-67; Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the SelfGovernment Theory of the FirstAmendment, 61 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1 (1990); Rabban, supra
note 81.
88 Gunther reprints this letter in full in his article. See Gunther, supra note 11, at
759-60.
89 Id. at 741.
90 GUNTHER, supa note 12, at 166-67.
91 In Debs, Holmes explicitly held that the validity of the conviction therein upheld
turned upon the existence of intent on the defendant's part "to obstruct the recruiting service" through his speech, approvingly noting that the lower court had instructed the jury that it could not convict absent a finding of specific intent. 249 U.S.
at 215-16. As Gunther relies on the "tendency" prong of Schenck alone, and misses
entirely the intent requirement of Debs, he is able to posit, as does Rabban, that
Holmes moved significantly forward in his libertarian dissents, but that Hand's test
was far more speech protective. Gunther, supranote 11, at 734-36; Rabban, supra note
81, at 1210. Gunther concludes that "in its origin clear and present danger reflected
neither special sensitivity to free speech values nor special concern for tailoring doctrine to implement those values." Gunther, sup-a note 11, at 736. See also G. Edward
White,Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free SpeechJurisprudence:The Human Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REv. 391, 402-03 (1992) (dividing Holmes's jurisprudence between his
"orthodox" pre-Abrams and his subsequent libertarian jurisprudence).
92 This letter (Holmes-Hand) is fully reprinted in Gunther, supra note 11, at 759.
93 Gunther includes a reprint of this letter (Hand-Holmes) in Gunther, supra note
11, at 758-59.
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effort to seem to agree with the result while trying to persuade the
94
master" as "it differs from the tenor of his remarks to others."
Unfortunately, Gunther does not keep his promise made in the
1975 article to set out these "remarks to others," making it impossible to evaluate Hand's real opinion on the merits of Debs's conviction. However, approval of Debs's conviction fits well into Hand's
test, if one accepts Holmes's finding for the Court that there was
sufficient evidence at trial to support a finding that the "intent of
the more general utterances was to encourage those present to obstruct the recruiting services.""
More fundamentally, one can
readily envision at least one context in which Holmes, but not
Hand, would protect speech: when such speech was a direct incitement to unlawful conduct but did not create a "clear and present
danger" of such conduct.
Hand did not move away, as many think, from his "advanced"
Masses opinion in writing the speech repressive opinion in United
States v. Dennis.9 6 Gunther explains the Dennis opinion as based
upon Hand's obedience to binding precedent in his position as a
lower court judge.97 There are two flaws with such an analysis.
First, it does not explain the innovative way in which Hand interpreted "clear and present danger" in Dennis. In seeking a constitutional paradigm for the protection of speech, Hand looked to the
common law of torts. In Dennis, Hand upheld the convictions of
several defendants under the Smith Act for "'willfully and knowingly' conspiring to organize the Communist Party of the United
States as a group to 'teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction' of the government 'by force and violence.' 98 Hand's opinion gave as the constitutional test the question "whether the gravity
of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 99
This formulation mirrored Hand's economic formulation of
tort liability, omitted by Gunther from this biography, in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co.100 As in Carroll Towing, Hand ruled that

a speaker speaks at his or her peril when the invasion of free
speech (the burden) is less than the magnitude of the injury combined (multiplied?) with its (im)probability. The identic nature of
94
95

Id. at 739.

Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212-13 (1919).
96 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
97 GumrHER, supra note 12, at 603-04.
98 Dennis, 183 F.2d at 205.
99 Id.
100 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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the tests should not be lost because in Dennis, Hand describes the
probability factor negatively-rather than multiplying by
probability he "discounts by improbability," which is, of course, the
same thing. Hand treated speech as a common law tort situation,
not seeing a difference between the two modes of reasoning, or
any need for a special level of protection.
Moreover, this approach is more, not less protective of speech
than Hand's approach in Masses, which permits the imposition of
liability regardless of any risk of harm (i.e., violation of the law).
Hand was not an early liberal who gradually became a conservative,
as the critics Gunther seeks to answer would depict Hand, or a liberal bound by precedent, as Gunther depicts Hand. Rather, Hand
was, as he himself stated, in "dissent from the whole approach to
the problem of Free Speech which the Supreme Court has adopted
during the last thirty-five or forty years." 10 1 Preferring his brightline (but restrictive) view in Masses, Hand sought to limit the impact of clear and present danger by reducing its scope to the level
of protection accorded to a garden-variety tort.
In fairness, it should be noted that Hand saw his Masses opinion as protective of free speech, and, in his correspondence with
Holmes and with Zechariah Chaffee, Hand demonstrated his concern with expanding the class of protected speech, so long as advo102
cacy of unlawful conduct stays outside of the circle of protection.
Holmes, more willing than Hand to protect "opinions that we
loathe," sought to include it within the circle from the beginning.
101 GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 604,
102 Id. at 161-70. Hand also insisted on a context-based definition of obscenity defined by what would be prurient to the average citizen, instead of the previously accepted common law understanding of obscenity permitting censorship based on
isolated passages. Hand attempted to scrap this archaic test, which permitted censorship of any materials, which could, in the eyes of the court, deprave the imaginations
of the most vulnerable classes of society. His efforts culminated in 1934, when the
Second Circuit, largely due to Hand's tireless efforts, affirmed a lower court finding
that James Joyce's lysses was not obscene. United States v. One Book Entitled
Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934) (rejecting common law definition of obscenity). See also GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 328-42 (tracing Hand's early efforts to reform
obscenity law and delineating his pivotal role in the Ulysses case).
Hand certainly emerges with "liberal laurels" in the development of the obscenity
laws. The Supreme Court did not go as far as Hand in reforming obscenity law until
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), as Gunther correctly notes. GUNTHER,
supra note 12, at 342. However, as with his Masses opinion, Hand's obscenity opinions
were not based on the Constitution's limitations on state or federal power, but rather
on constructing existing law in harmony with the values of the First Amendment. For
Hand, the right of the state to proscribe obscenity appears not to have been in doubt;
he wanted a narrower definition to protect meritorious literature from the Anthony
Comstocks of his day, and every day. Id. at 331-32, 337-38.
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Nonetheless, Holmes's progress toward a high quantum of protection was slower than Hand's."' 3 Only in Abrams did Holmes and
Brandeis give real teeth to the clear and present danger test. Once
Holmes and Brandeis took this step, their test was, in fact, far more
protective than Hand's test, despite his persistent clinging to it.
Hand's constitutional and political views lead Gunther to categorize him as a "liberal" although he notes Hand's own feeling that
he was "a conservative among liberals and a liberal among conservatives. " 10' In fact, despite his support of the Progressive Party and
of tolerance as a fundamental virtue, Hand's record on civil liberties issues presents an extremely mixed bag. Gunther portrays
Hand's extreme reluctance to overturn laws on the basis of a judicial finding of unconstitutionality as an outgrowth of Hand's belief
in democracy and corresponding unwillingness to vest "revisory"
power, as Hand himself put it, in "those nine gents in Washington."'1 5 Thus, despite his abhorrence of "Know-Nothingism,"
Hand opposed "liberal" substantive due process decisions such as
Pierce v. Society of Sisters0 6 and Meyer v. Nebraska."" Rather oddly,
Hand did not see the First Amendment values implicit in these free
association decisions, and viewed them as the sort of judicial freebooting from the left that he roundly condemned from the
right.' 0
Toward the end of Hand's life, in The Bill of Rights, his controversial attack on the Warren Court, 10 9 Hand would take this position to a length that even Gunther regards as "outside the
mainstream of modern legal thought." 110 In The Bill of Rights,
Hand argued that the judiciary could not enforce the first nine
amendments to the Constitution due to their vagueness."' He described these provisions of the Constitution as "admonitory or hortatory, not definite enough to be guides on concrete occasions."112
Hand even declared that no scope in the Constitution existed for
103 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
104 GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 352.
105 Id. at 378,
106 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (invalidating state law forbidding private school education

by requiring all children within state to attend public school).
107 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (invalidating state statute forbidding the teaching of
any foreign language below the high school level).
108 GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 378-80.
109 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RicHT-rs (1958). Gunther himself describes this
book as "an attack both on the Warren Court's general jurisprudence and on some of
its specific rulings." GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 655.
110 Id. at 656.
111
112

Id. at 655-56
Id. at 656; HAND, supra note 108, at 31, 34, 42.
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heightened review of statutes impacting upon freedom of expression. As a matter of constitutional interpretation, Hand stated,
such statutes should be subject only to extremely deferential review
to ascertain their rationality.'
On this last point, however, Hand
was prepared to give way, as a matter of practical utility, and permit
judicial enforcement.114
Without fully revisiting the decades-old Bill of Rights debate in
a book review of this scope, it is ironic that Hand, an expert in
parsing often abstruse statutes, could cheerfully render so many
sections of the Bill of Rights wholly without meaning. Just like the
Supreme Court in the Slaughter House Cases," 5 which eliminated
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by construing it in pari materiawith that of the Fifth Amendment, Hand in The Bill of Rights overlooked the most basic rule of
construing any legal instrument: each provision is to be construed
so as to accord it some meaning. Although some eminent scholars
have suggested a similar approach to the Ninth Amendment,1 16 the
deliberate nullification of portions of the very instrument that a
court engages to construe must surely present a danger signal to
the judge.
Moreover, the justification for the extraordinary self-abnegation on the part of the Judiciary urged by Hand, the alleged lack of
specificity of the Constitutional provisions at issue, rendering even
an attempt an obstruction to the Judiciary's vital "albeit less glamorous duties, especially the interpretation of statutes"" 7 is less than
compelling. This is especially true in view of the lack of specificity
of many other legal concepts which the courts deem themselves
able to interpret, such as the "reasonable person" standard, the
subject of uproarious satire.' 1 8 Likewise, the "originality" requirement for copyright protection is open-ended, as are the "Writings"
protected thereunder according to the Constitution. So too, are
113 In view of the specificity of the First Amendment, as Gunther points out, the
textual difficulties which formed the basis of Hand's aversion to due process analysis
did not exist, leaving Hand with essentially a policy preference. GUNTHER, supra note
12, at 657-58.
114 Id. at 657-58. Similarly, Hand deemed the exercise ofjudicial review of statutes
for unconstitutionality as unwarranted by the text of the Constitution. As a practical
matter though, Hand was willing to permit judicial review as needed to preserve coherence in our federal system. Id. at 655-56; HAND, supra note 108, at 29.
115 16 Wall. 36 (1873).

116 Cf C.L. BLACK, On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 186, 186-201 (1986).
117 GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 658.
118 A.P. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAw 2-4

(1959).
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statutes based upon "moral turpitude." Yet Hand felt himself competent to give meaning to each of these terms, and did so as a
judge, not a legislator. 119
Hand would limit even the seemingly specific provisions of the
Bill of Rights involving the procedural rights of criminal defendants against self-incrimination and confrontation of witnesses to
"their historic meaning." 120 With this, Hand elevates seventeenth
century practice over the textual language of the Constitution.
It is difficult to evaluate this position dispassionately, as Gunther has attempted. The author points to Hand's life-long opposition to substantive due process analysis and his refusal to
opportunistically avail "his" side (the liberal) of advantages he
would deny the conservatives. 21 Relatedly, Hand's specific condemnation of Brown v. Board of Education is explained as a "delayed
surrender" to Felix Frankfurter's interpretation of the case. Gunther details letters between Frankfurter and Hand, in which Frankfurter described Brown as turning not on a judicial finding of the
impropriety of discrimination by race, which Gunther believes
but on a special value assigned by the
Hand would have supported,
1 22
education.
to
Court
Yet these explanations are, in the end, unconvincing. Substantive due process in the Lochner sense ofjudicial importation of personal policy preferences stands on a very different footing than
enforcement of the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether one accepts
or rejects the variants of "incorporation" theory, the provisions of
the Bill of Rights are not vague, unratified theories held only by a
segment of the population, as were "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
12 3
Statics" so witheringly rejected by Holmes in his Lochner dissent.
Rather, the Bill of Rights was ratified with the rest of the Constitution-indeed its omission nearly prevented ratification of the Consti119 Hand construed "moral turpitude" or "good moral character" for purposes of
Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920,
naturalization law in the following cases: United States ex rel.
921 (2d Cir. 1929); Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1947);
Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir. 1949). See generally GUNTHER,
supra note 12, at 658 (discussing these cases). Hand construed "originality" for purposes of Copyright protection in Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) discussed
by GUNTHER supra note 12, at 317-18. Gunther also discusses Hand's ability to interpret the constitutional meaning of "writings" in Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau,
276 F. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Id. at 319.
120
121
122
123

Id. at 658.
Id. at 664-66.

Id. at 666-71.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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tution. Hand offers no compelling reason for treating these
solemn acts of the American people which made possible the formation of the government he served so well like the economic theories rightfully rejected by anti-Lochner liberals.
Moreover, had Hand rejected the Fourteenth Amendment
alone, or rather all variants of incorporation doctrine, his theory
would at least have made sense. But in denying the judiciary power
to enforce the Bill of Rights against the federal government as well
as the states, he foreswore coherence for extremism.
If the federal government cannot be stopped from violating its
constitution, then what good is that constitution? Hand argues
that the power of judicial review should be limited to, as Gunther
summarizes, "court enforcement of the boundaries of the powers
of each organ of government, those pertaining to state and national power in the federal system, rather than those pertaining to
individual rights." 124 However, these provisions are no more clear
or specific than the Bill of Rights, and are expressed in the same
broad terms. 125 In view of this, Hand's suggested judicial deference is in fact tantamount to arrogance, choosing, by refusing to
enforce them, which provisions may be flouted at will by the government of the day. These are problems left untouched by Hand,
whose reading of the Constitution in his last significant work seems
more like an account of Parliamentary supremacy than one of the
American tripartite system.
On criminal procedure issues, Hand vacillated. Gunther is
able to point to eloquent statements by Hand protecting Fourth
Amendment rights and condemning coerced confessions. 26 On
the other hand, a passionate pair of letters he sent his friend Frankfurter in 1923 bespeak a harshness and indeed a brio in the face of
the prospect of injustice at odds with the rest of the portrait Gunther paints. In 1923, Hand wrote Frankfurter that:
[o] ur dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused.
Our procedure has always been haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to
fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that ob124 GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 656.
125 For example, Article II simply states

that the "executive power shall be vested in
a President of the United States" without specifying what that power shall be.
Although Article II gives instances of that power, it is never described in exclusive
terms, nor are the instances given terribly specific. Similarly, the parameters of "the
judicial power" to be exercised only by judges as defined by Article III is far from
clear, as reflected by the creation of so-called "Article II courts." See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTTUONAL LAw 51-61 (2d ed. 1988).
126 GuNTHER, supra note 12, at 597.
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1 27
structs, delays and defeats the prosecution of crime.
Hand elaborated in another letter:
Like you, I vary somewhat in my views about the procedural protections accorded defendants. Occasionally the show goes
wrong. On the whole when it does it is because the public is in a
hanging mood and I doubt in those cases the efficacy of the
safeguards you mention. Perhaps I underestimate them. In ordinary times you will agree that American criminal jurisprudence has been fettered by the web of red tape which has always
surrounded it. We must in some way learn to deal more directly
and effectively with the commission of crime if we are to check
the lawlessness which is our curse. I had rather take my chances
of occasional judicial lynchings than hamstring28the course ofjustice, though I admit it is a matter of degree.'

Apparently, the "degree" Hand speaks of is the "third degree"
for the unfortunate losers of this judicial lynching sweepstakes.
This odd mixture of compassion and callousness, of sensitivity and
harshness, makes Hand so difficult a figure to assess. With due
respect for what Gunther has accomplished in this readable, informative book, the almost roseate picture of the judge that he
paints fails to come to grips with this complex, ambiguous jurist's
record, even as it sets that record out.
CONCLUSION

Near the end of his book, in describing the furor that surrounded The Bill of Rights, Gunther asks "Had Hand turned against
liberal values? Had Hand turned conservative?"1 29 The answer
Gunther gives is that he had not, based upon his belief in judicial
restraint. That answer may be correct by the standards of Hand's
relative youth perhaps, when the terms "liberal" and "conservative"
related more to one's views of the legitimacy of economic regulation than to the issues of personal liberty.1"' Yet even during the
Lochner era there existed liberals in the modern sense of the word,
and Hand was never among them, although his personal and political preferences were libertarian. In truth, although Hand remained consistent, the meanings affixed to the labels changed.
In today's usage of the word, however, Hand was, as Douglas
described Frankfurter, "a brilliant advocate of his conservative phi127 Id. at 391.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 664.
130 See William F. Swindler, The Court and the Constitution in the Twentieth Century: The

New Legality: 1932-1968 (1970) at vii-viii; Urofsky, supra note 55, at 96.
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losophy". 3 That does not make this brilliant, workmanlike judge,
devoted to a philosophy of skepticism, yet riven with compassion
for those whose fates he decided, less admirable.1 3 2 It does, however make one question Gunther's insistence on burnishing
Hand's tarnished liberal halo. Perhaps the answer is contained in
Gunther's Preface, which he concludes by observing that, although
he has tried to portray Hand "warts and all," "he remains my idol
still." 133 Gunther's admiration for his subject may have led him to
cling to Hand's reputation for liberalism, to overestimate the degree to which Hand stood for values which Gunther himself holds.
One dimension, however, of Gunther's portrayal that rings
true is the passion with which Hand approached his job, and the
lack of detachment he felt from his fellow citizens. Gunther repeatedly describes Hand as tempted to join progressive political
causes out of fellow feeling with the outsiders in society. Hand agonized over each appeal to that compassion and sometimes spoke
out, despite his belief that as a judge it was improper for him to
enter the controversies of the day. Where detachment came easily
for Holmes, Hand was no Olympian. No stranger, he was, instead,
134
a brother.

131 SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY,

supra note 4, at 8-9.

132 Gunther gives repeated examples of Hand's willingness to leave his cushioned

social milieu to meet with, defend, and to befriend other social outsiders. For example, Hand was outspoken in his opposition to anti-Semitism. GUNTHER, supra note 12,
at 115-18. Hand also became personally engaged in the plight of immigrants brought
before him in deportation cases. Id. at 303-04.
133 Id. at xviii.
134 Id. at 345 (detailing Holmes's "Olympian" detachment). See generally BAKER,
supra note 3; WHITE, supra note 3, at 478-79. The contrast between "strangers and
brothers" is borrowed from C.P. SNOW, STRANGERS AND BROTHERS (1940-1970, omnibus ed. 1972), an eleven volume novel sequence exploring, among many other
themes, intimacy and alienation.

